The University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 1 Symposium—Regulating Marijuana at Home
and Abroad

Article 10

1-1-2017

Comparative Cannabis: Approaches to Marijuana
Agriculture Regulation in the United States and
Canada
Ryan B. Stoa
Concordia Univeristy School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ryan B. Stoa, Comparative Cannabis: Approaches to Marijuana Agriculture Regulation in the United States and Canada, 49 U. Pac. L. Rev.
89 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview/vol49/iss1/10

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in The University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.

Comparative Cannabis: Approaches to Marijuana
Agriculture Regulation in the United States and Canada
Ryan B. Stoa*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 90
II. DIVERGENT PATHS TOWARD CRIMINALIZATION AND LEGALIZATION:
BRIEF HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA ........ 94
A. Prohibition and Legalization in the United States ..................................95
B. Prohibition and Legalization in Canada .................................................98
III. SUBNATIONAL APPROACHES TO MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES .......................................................... 101
A. California ..............................................................................................103
B. Colorado................................................................................................105
C. Washington ............................................................................................108
IV. A NATIONAL APPROACH TO MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE REGULATION
IN CANADA ................................................................................................... 110
A. Cultivation Requirements of the Medical Marihuana Access
Regulations ............................................................................................110
B. Cultivation Requirements of the Marihuana for Medical Purposes
Regulations ............................................................................................112
C. Looking Forward to Legalization Legislation and Agricultural
Regulations ............................................................................................113
V. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 114

*
Ryan B. Stoa is an Associate Professor of Law at Concordia University School of Law. The author is
grateful to feedback provided by participants of the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
Symposium on Regulating Marijuana at Home and Abroad (March 3rd, 2017). Bartholomew Stoddard
provided timely and valuable research assistance. Contact: rstoa@cu-portland.edu; www.ryanstoa.com. © 2017,
Ryan B. Stoa.

89

2017 / Approaches to Marijuana Agriculture Regulation in the U.S. and Canada
ABSTRACT
The United States and Canada may be friends and allies, but the two
countries’ approaches to the regulation of marijuana agriculture have
not evolved in tandem. On the contrary, their respective paths toward
legalization and regulation of marijuana agriculture are remarkably
divergent. In the United States, where marijuana remains a federally
prohibited and tightly-controlled substance, legalization and regulation
have remained the province of state legislatures and their administrative
agencies for decades. In Canada, a succession of court cases paving the
way toward medicinal marijuana use has prompted the federal
government to develop a national framework committed to “legalize,
regulate, and restrict access” to marijuana.
Many jurisdictions attempting to regulate (or exploring the possibility of
regulating) the marijuana industry struggle to address the first step in
the supply chain—agriculture. This essay will compare and contrast the
experiences of the United States and Canada in the regulation of
marijuana agriculture. It is evident that there is more than one
regulatory approach that can provide a safe and sustainable product to
consumers while promoting equity among farmers. Nonetheless, the
trials and tribulations of pioneering governments can illuminate the
pitfalls, consequences, and drawbacks policymakers are likely to
encounter in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal marijuana policy in the United States and Canada has, in recent
decades, been fixated on prohibition. That may be about to change. In 2017,
Canada is expected to become the first ‘Group of Seven’ nation to propose
legislation that would legalize and regulate marijuana for recreational use.1
According to the Canadian government’s party platform, “marijuana prohibition
does not work.”2 In a change of direction from decades of prohibition, the
government is now calling for Parliament to “legalize, regulate, and restrict
access to marijuana.”3 Importantly, policymakers and regulators are in the
process of developing a federal framework for marijuana regulation that would

1. AFP, Canada to Legalize Recreational Marijuana by Mid-2018: Report, YAHOO! (Mar. 26, 2017),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/canada-legalize-recreational-marijuana-mid-2018-report-145852604.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Marijuana, LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA, goo.gl/WK8im6 (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. Id.
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address agricultural considerations, including environmental impacts and
protections for small-scale farmers.4
The mood of the United States federal government is a marked contrast.
Marijuana has been a federally criminalized substance since passage of the
Controlled Substances Act in 1970.5 Following the 2016 presidential elections,
there is uncertainty regarding President Donald Trump’s stance toward marijuana
legalization and regulation on the state level.6 However, early indications suggest
his administration is not interested in a federal regulatory framework.7 Although
the Republican Party in control of the federal government generally supports
federalism principles and state autonomy, there is fear that the federal
government will interfere with state marijuana legalization and regulation
efforts.8 Absent a regulatory framework that goes beyond prohibition, there is
little hope for federal involvement in agricultural or environmental issues facing
the marijuana industry.
In addition to this contrast on the federal level, the United States and Canada
have divergent experiences when it comes to subnational marijuana legalization
and regulation. In the United States, marijuana legalization has gained
momentum and become commonplace on the state level. California became the
first state to legalize medical marijuana use in 1996.9 Colorado and Washington
then became the first states to legalize recreational marijuana use in 2012.10 At
the time of writing, twenty-eight states had legalized medical marijuana, while
eight states (plus the District of Columbia) had legalized recreational marijuana.11
4. See A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada: The Final Report of the
Task Force on Cannabis Legalization and Regulation, HEALTH CANADA (Dec. 2016), http://healthy
canadians.gc.ca/task-force-marijuana-groupe-etude/framework-cadre/index-eng.php (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. Collin B. Walsh & Daniel T. Nau, The History, Law, and Psychology of Criminalizing Marijuana: A
Comparative Analysis with Alcohol and Tobacco, 274 INDIANA LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES 23 (2013).
6. John Schroyer, Bart Schaneman & Omar Sacirbey, Legal Uncertainty for Marijuana Industry after
Trump Election, Conference Panelists Say, MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://goo.gl/hz5GEs (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
7. Current U.S. Attorney General, tasked with enforcing the nation’s federal laws, stated as Senator of
Alabama, “Good people don’t smoke marijuana.” Sean Cockerham, Congress’ Cannabis Caucus Ready to
‘Bump Heads’ with Anti-pot Trump Attorney General, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Feb. 16, 2017, 6:29 PM),
https://goo.gl/oqrarB (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Id.
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Westlaw 2017); Adam Cohen, California's Prop 19:
Leading the Way to Pot Legalization, Time (Oct. 6, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,2023860,00.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2012) (Colorado constitutional amendment 64); Wash. Initiative
Measure No. 502 (2012); Maia Szalavitz, Two U.S. States Become First to Legalize Marijuana, TIME (Nov. 7,
2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/11/07/two-u-s-states-become-first-to-legalize-marijuana/ (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG (last visited Apr. 2, 2017),
https://goo.gl/7XV2kr (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Marijuana Overview, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (April 3, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/marijuana-overview.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Only four states have maintained a strict prohibition policy on marijuana
cultivation, distribution, sale, or consumption.12 These states represent less than
five percent of the U.S. population.13 Despite the federal prohibition, there are
now a multitude of state regulatory frameworks in place, with a variety of
statutory goals and approaches to compare.
Canada has not experienced the same subnationally-driven path toward
legalization. Instead, the erosion of prohibition has been driven largely by the
courts. Regina v. Parker, 49 O.R. (3rd) 481 [2000], set the stage for legalization
by declaring the federal government’s marijuana prohibition unconstitutional
absent an exemption for medical necessity.14 As the Court stated, “[t]he
marijuana laws forced the accused to choose between commission of a crime to
obtain effective medical treatment and inadequate treatment,” a deprivation of
liberty, security, and fundamental justice.15 Invalidating the marijuana prohibition
forced the Canadian Parliament to develop at least a basic framework for medical
marijuana use.16 Although the development of subsequent regulatory frameworks
has been inconsistent, Canada’s experience with marijuana regulation on the
federal level can serve as a meaningful starting point with which to pursue
recreational legalization and regulation.
A more developed exploration of U.S. and Canadian experiences with
marijuana legalization and regulation is provided in the next section. However,
this essay’s primary focus is on the contrasting experiences of these two
countries with respect to marijuana agriculture.17 The agricultural component of
the marijuana industry is, after all, where the chain of supply begins. And yet, the
need for thoughtful and realistic agricultural regulations often takes a back seat to
more visible concerns, such as distribution, marketing, sale, and consumption.
The lack of attention paid to marijuana cultivation is a disservice to farmers,
regulators, and consumers. Farmers often confront ambiguous or unresponsive
legal requirements, and are forced to choose between staying in the shadows of

12. By “strict prohibition policy,” I mean states that have passed neither decriminalization laws nor allow
for non-psychoactive marijuana consumption for medical purposes. These states are Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
South Dakota, and West Virginia. Marijuana Overview, supra note 11; State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 7, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medicalmarijuana-laws.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
13. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s July 2016 estimates, the combined population of Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, and South Dakota is 12,088,936. The estimated population of the United States is 323,127,513.
Population Estimates, July 1, 2016, (V2016), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://goo.gl/zlyP5G (last visited July 20,
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. Regina v. Parker (2000), 49 O.R. 3d 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
15. Id. at ¶ 7–9.
16. See, Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations, Repealed SOR/2013-230 (Can.).
17. This essay draws from, and builds on, the author’s previous work on marijuana agriculture regulation.
See Ryan B. Stoa, Weed and Water Law: Regulating Legal Marijuana, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 565 (2016); Ryan B.
Stoa, Marijuana Agriculture Law: Regulation at the Root of an Industry, 69(2) FLORIDA L. REV. (forthcoming,
2017); Ryan B. Stoa, Marijuana Appellations: The Case for Cannabicultural Designations of Origin, 11(1)
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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the illicit market or attempting to comply with a confusing web of unrealistic
regulations. Policymakers and administrative agencies face their own challenge:
tasked with creating an ambitious regulatory framework from scratch. These
regulators often do not have a history with the marijuana industry, or analogous
regulations to fall back on. Consumers and the public at large, finally, benefit
from having a diversity of market options, as well as marijuana that is sustainably
cultivated.
The early record of marijuana agriculture regulation in the U.S. and Canada
is mixed. Some U.S. states, such as California, acknowledge the agricultural
component of the marijuana industry and are taking steps to develop a regulatory
framework that supports farming communities and the environment.18 Other
states, such as New York and Florida, aim to control cultivation by severely
limiting the number of producers.19 In any case, most states have not developed a
robust regulatory scheme for marijuana that comprehensively addresses
agricultural issues.
Canada’s approach to marijuana agriculture regulation has been
simultaneously restrictive and permissive under the current medically-focused
framework. On the one hand, Health Canada (authorized to regulate cultivation)
has only issued fifty cultivation licenses nation-wide,20 despite receiving 1,665
applications.21 Nine Canadian provinces have two cultivators or less.22 In
addition, marijuana can only be grown indoors,23 an energy-intensive agricultural
method that artificially reproduces the light, soil, and water conditions found on
outdoor farms. On the other hand, licensed cultivators are allowed to develop,
grow, and sell whatever strain(s) of marijuana they see fit, and are free to set
their own prices.24
In anticipation of legislation that would legalize and regulate recreational
marijuana in Canada, the federal government formed a task force to make
recommendations on marijuana policy.25 The task force report recommended

18. Infra Part III.
19. Id.
20. Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, GOV’T OF CAN.,
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medical-use-marijuana/licensedproducers/authorized-licensed-producers-medical-purposes.html (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
21. Application Process: Becoming a Licensed Producer of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, GOV’T OF
CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medical-use-marijuana/licensedproducers/application-process-becoming-licensed-producer.html (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 20. Five provinces
have no licensed cultivators.
23. Frequently Asked Questions, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/
drugs-health-products/medical-use-marijuana/licensed-producers/frequently-asked-questions-medical-usemarihuana.html (last visited July 2, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
24. Id.
25. A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada, supra note 4, at 2.
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significant changes to the current approach to agricultural regulation.26 Notably,
the report recommended that: 1) the federal government take the lead on
regulating agriculture; 2) licensing schemes be adapted to promote a diversity of
cultivators, including small-scale farmers; and 3) environmental protection be
promoted through regulations that include licensing and supporting outdoor
farmers.27 If implemented, the recommendations would represent a markedly
more diverse and inclusive approach to marijuana agriculture regulation.
This essay proceeds accordingly. In Part II, a brief history of marijuana
prohibition, legalization, and regulation in the U.S. and Canada is provided and
contrasted. Part III paints a picture of marijuana agriculture regulation in the U.S.
by exploring approaches in three states (California, Colorado, and Washington)
where regulatory frameworks for cultivation are relatively developed.28 Part IV
tells the Canadian story (where agricultural production is, for now, scarcely
permitted), while looking ahead to impending regulations for recreational
marijuana.29 Part V concludes by drawing out common regulatory successes and
failures, with an eye toward lessons learned that can inform the future
development of marijuana agriculture regulations in the United States and
Canada.
II. DIVERGENT PATHS TOWARD CRIMINALIZATION AND LEGALIZATION: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
While regulatory approaches to marijuana in the U.S. and Canada are
nascent, cultivation of marijuana is centuries-old.30 One of humanity’s oldest
cultivated crops, marijuana can be traced back 12,000 years to hunter-gatherers
who appreciated its nutritious and psychoactive properties.31 In Neolithic times
marijuana traveled from its roots in China and Siberia along the Silk Road to the
Middle East and Europe.32 Once there it flourished in classical Greek, Roman,
and Arab societies.33 European colonialism cemented marijuana as a global
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Infra Part III.
29. Infra Part IV.
30. This section draws on previous research addressing marijuana agriculture. See Ryan B. Stoa, Weed
and Water Law: Regulating Legal Marijuana, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 565 (2016); Ryan B. Stoa, Marijuana
Agriculture Law: Regulation at the Root of an Industry, 69(2) FLORIDA L. REV. (forthcoming, 2017); and Ryan
B. Stoa, Marijuana Appellations: The Case for Cannabicultural Designations of Origin, 11(1) HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2017).
31. Barney Warf, High Points: An Historical Geography of Cannabis, 104 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 415,
419 (2014) (citing ERNEST L. ABEL, MARIHUANA: THE FIRST TWELVE THOUSAND YEARS (Plenum Press 1st ed.
1980)).
32. Id. at 419–20.
33. Id. at 423 (citing JAMES L. BUTRICA, THE MEDICAL USE OF CANNABIS AMONG THE GREEKS AND
ROMANS (Hawthorn 1st ed. 2006); D.C.A. HILLMAN PH.D., THE CHEMICAL MUSE (Thomas Dunne Books 1st
ed. 2008); ERNEST L. ABEL, MARIHUANA: THE FIRST TWELVE THOUSAND YEARS (Plenum Press 1st ed. 1980);
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commodity, spreading its cultivation, trade, and use throughout the Western
Hemisphere and into what is now the United States and Canada.34
A. Prohibition and Legalization in the United States
Marijuana in the United States was for many years overshadowed by the
other major derivative of its taxonomic species cannabis sativa: hemp.35 While
marijuana is primarily grown and used for its medicinal or recreational
psychoactive properties, hemp strains are grown to produce food, textiles, paper,
and other materials.36 Queen Elizabeth required large landowners throughout the
British Empire to grow hemp to counter Britain’s reliance on Russian hemp
imports;37 later the Jamestown colonists would be required to do the same.38 Both
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were hemp growers, and the
Declaration of Independence was written on hemp.39 John Adams was a
prominent supporter of hemp cultivation, writing frequently about its benefits.40
“Seems to me if grate Men dont leeve off writing Pollyticks, breaking Heads,
boxing Ears, ringing Noses and kicking Breeches, we shall by and by want a
world of Hemp more for our own consumshon,” Adams wrote.41
Hemp and marijuana would continue to be grown throughout the 19th and
early 20th centuries.42 Like any other legal agricultural commodity, marijuana
was subject to variations in state agricultural laws and policies. For example, the
fact that a water rights dispute before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1852
involved a contractual obligation to use water solely for certain purposes that
included a hemp-mill was found unremarkable by the court.43 In 1947, a
FRANZ ROSENTHAL, THE HERB: HASHISH VERSUS MEDIEVAL MUSLIM SOCIETY (Brill Press 1st ed. 1971)).
34. Id. at 425–26 (citing WILLIAM PARTRIDGE, CANNABIS AND CULTURAL GROUPS IN A COLOMBIAN
MUNICIPIO (Mouton Publishers 1st ed. 1975); JOHNATHAN GREEN, CANNABIS (Thunder’s Mouth Press 1st ed.
2002); JAMES H. MILLS, CANNABIS IN COLONIAL INDIA: PRODUCTION, STATE INTERVENTION, AND RESISTANCE
IN THE LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY BENGALI LANDSCAPE (Oxford University Press 1st ed. 2005)).
35. For a review of the taxonomy of marijuana and hemp, see generally Ernest Small & Arthur Cronquist,
A Practical and Natural Taxonomy for Cannabis, 25 TAXON, no. 4, at 405, 410 (1976); Shannon L. Datwyler
Ph.D. & George D. Weiblen Ph.D., Genetic Variation in Hemp and Marijuana (Cannabis sativa L.) According
to Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphisms, 51 J. OF FORENSIC SCI. 371 (2006).
36. See generally, ROWAN ROBINSON, THE GREAT BOOK OF HEMP: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE
ENVIRONMENTAL, COMMERCIAL, AND MEDICINAL USES OF THE WORLD’S MOST EXTRAORDINARY PLANT 4
(1st ed. 1996).
37. Warf, supra note 31, at 426.
38. MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA – MEDICAL, RECREATIONAL
AND SCIENTIFIC 16 (1st ed. 2012).
39. Id. at 16, 18.
40. Corliss Knapp Engle, John Adams, Farmer and Gardner, 61 ARNOLDIA, no. 4, at 9, 10 (2002).
41. JOHN ADAMS, III. HUMPHREY PLOUGHJOGGER TO THE BOSTON EVENING-POST (June 20, 1763),
reprinted in Papers of John Adams, Volume 1, at 7 (MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y ed., 2017)
42. By some accounts, it became the third largest cash crop in the United States by the mid-19th century.
Lee, supra note 38, at 19.
43. Washabaugh v. Oyster, 18 Pa. 497, 503 (1852).
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California tax dispute involved the development of wells for purposes of
irrigating hemp.44 The court overseeing the dispute thought the plan could “prove
a profitable industry,” before moving on to the legal matter at issue.45
But the widespread use of both hemp and marijuana in the United States
catalyzed opposition to cannabis sativa’s legality from multiple angles. On the
one hand, marijuana’s early popularity with immigrants and bohemian
communities produced reactionary prejudices that prompted crude public
campaigns to criminalize the drug.46 On the other hand, hemp’s industrial
versatility was a threat to the cotton industry and other producers of textiles.47
Despite strong support in the medical and pharmaceutical industries, twenty-nine
states banned cannabis between 1915–1931.48
The federal government then passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,
creating barriers to marijuana production, sale, and consumption.49 The Supreme
Court’s ruling in Leary v. United States overturned the Marihuana Tax Act on the
grounds that compliance would violate a person’s right against selfincrimination.50 The decision prompted Congress to repeal the Act and replace it
with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which
categorized marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic with prohibitions on cultivation,
sale, possession, and use.51 Marijuana has been a black market crop ever since.52
Because states developed modern regulatory regimes in the latter half of the
twentieth century,53 after marijuana was criminalized, those regimes have never
been regulated by the marijuana industry. This is true of many agricultural laws
and policies as well, which have traditionally been dictated or influenced by
federal agricultural policy. The pillars of agricultural law and policy set in
motion in the twentieth century—crop subsidies, government-backed insurance,
and direct relief payments—are still in place today.54

44. Lerdo Land Co. v. Commissioner, 1947 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 16, *7 (1947).
45. Id.
46. Warf, supra note 31, at 429–30. See also REEFER MADNESS (Motion Picture Ventures 1936)
(depicting the graphic horrors of marijuana use in ways that would appear satirical today).
47. Warf, supra note 31, at 429.
48. Walsh, supra note 5, at 19.
49. Marihuana Tax Act of Aug. 2, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
50. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 13 (1969).
51. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (1970); see also Walsh, supra note 5, at 23.
52. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of Oct. 27, 1970, supra note 51.
53. See, e.g., Ryan B. Stoa, Florida Water Management Districts and the Florida Water Resources Act:
The Challenges of Basin-Level Management, 7 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 74 (2015).
54. The Agricultural Act of 2014, which establishes agricultural spending for the next ten years, allocates
$44.4 billion for commodity programs and $90 billion for crop insurance. Disaster relief funds were distributed
a week after the Act was signed into law, including $100 million for livestock losses in California. Agricultural
Act of 2014, H.R. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014); Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, In One Graph, WASH.
POST. (Jan. 28, 2014), http://goo.gl/gQOvl8 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Press
Release, USDA: Obama Administration Announces Additional Assistance to Californians Impacted by Drought
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Needless to say, the marijuana industry was not swept up in these initiatives.
For the most part, marijuana cultivation in the United States for much of the
twentieth century was conducted by small-scale farmers acting in violation of
state and federal agricultural laws and policies.55 Despite prohibition and a lack
of government support, however, marijuana farmers have done quite well for
themselves in the United States. A 2006 pro-marijuana study, focused on
valuation, pegged the total value of domestic marijuana production at $35.8
billion, based on an estimate of over 56 million plants grown annually.56 If
accurate, the figures would make marijuana the largest cash crop in the United
States, and a top five cash crop in thirty-nine states.57 Today there are
approximately 50,000 marijuana farms in the state of California alone.58 There
are as many marijuana farms in Humboldt County, California, as there are
wineries statewide.59
The ineffectiveness of prohibition, combined with a public that is
increasingly receptive to marijuana use, has led to a rapid shift in marijuana
policy on the state level. Legalization is largely taking place through voter
demands and ballot initiatives. California, perhaps not surprisingly, became the
first state to legalize medical marijuana use when voters passed Proposition 215,
the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.60 Colorado and Washington became the first
states to legalize recreational marijuana use in 2012, when voters passed
Amendment 64: The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act, and Washington
Initiative 502, respectively.61 Following the 2016 election, and at the time of
writing, medical marijuana use was legal in twenty-eight states, while eight states
(plus the District of Columbia) had legalized recreational marijuana.62 Only five
states have maintained a strict prohibition policy on marijuana that does not
allow for decriminalization or medical use of any kind.63 While the federal
(Feb. 14, 2014), available at http://goo.gl/EdwPRg (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
55. See Alissa Walker, How Growing More Weed Can Help California Fix Its Water Problems,
GIZMODO (Oct. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/ZEwFpT (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(noting the estimated 50,000 pot farms in California alone).
56. Jon Gettman Ph.D., Marijuana Production in the United States, THE BULL. OF CANNABIS REFORM,
Dec. 2006, at 1, 13. Those estimates have been questioned, with production valuations closer to $3–5 billion.
See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 41 (1st ed. 2012). See
also, Michael Montgomery, Marijuana Not Top U.S. Cash Crop: Book, CA. WATCH, NBC BAY AREA NEWS,
http://goo.gl/InOpuu (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); and
PATRICK REA ET AL., THE STATE OF LEGAL MARIJUANA MARKETS (3rd ed. 2014).
57. Gettman, supra note 56, at 13.
58. Walker, supra note 55.
59. Id.
60. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY. CODE § 11362.5 (Westlaw 2017); Cohen, supra note 9.
61. Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2012) (Colorado constitutional amendment 64); Wash. Initiative
Measure No. 502 (2012); Szalavitz, supra note 10.
62. 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 11; Marijuana Overview, supra note 11.
63. By “strict prohibition policy,” I mean states that have passed neither decriminalization laws nor allow
for non-psychoactive marijuana consumption for medical purposes. These states are Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, and
South Dakota. Marijuana Overview, supra note 11; State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 12.
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marijuana prohibition continues to suppress development of the marijuana
industry, it is clear that state efforts to legalize marijuana will continue, creating
demand for appropriate regulatory frameworks.
B. Prohibition and Legalization in Canada
Canada was similarly swept up in the anti-marijuana fervor of the early
twentieth-century. As with the United States, prohibition of marijuana was partly
motivated by race relations and fears that drug users would corrupt and violate
innocent women and children.64 Unlike the U.S., however, Canadian prohibition
efforts were driven by the apparent connection between psychoactive drugs and
Chinese-Canadian culture.65 Prior to 1908, Canadians were free to purchase
commercially available drugs such as opium and cocaine.66 But the rancor
between white and Chinese Canadians prompted a backlash against these and
other drugs, and legislation quickly followed suit between 1908–1920.67 This
wave of drug criminalization culminated in the 1923 Act to Prohibit the Improper
Use of Opium and Other Drugs, which listed marijuana as a prohibited
substance.68
Canadian marijuana cultivation, use, and prosecution remained relatively
dormant until the 1960s, when both consumption and prosecutions increased
exponentially.69 The Narcotic Control Act of 1961 was an attempt to crack down,
increasing penalties and enabling prosecutions.70 According to some, marijuana
users became the primary target of law enforcement during the 1960s.71 Unlike in

64. CATHERINE CARSTAIRS, ‘HOP HEADS’ AND ‘HYPES’: DRUG USE, REGULATION AND RESISTANCE IN
CANADA, 1920-1961, at 32–33 (2000).
65. Id. at 15.
66. Id. at 6.
67. These include the 1908 Opium Act, , the Opium and Drug Act of 1911, and the Opium and Narcotic
Drug Act of 1920. Guy Ati Dion, The Structure of Drug Prohibition in International Law and in Canadian
Law, Senate of Canada, Appendix 2 (Aug. 1999), https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/371/ille/
presentation/dion-e.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
68. See also Daniel Schwartz, Marijuana Was Criminalized In 1923, But Why?, CBCNEWS: HEALTH
(May 3, 2014), https://goo.gl/7QKPdt (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); and Deborah
Yedlin, To Some, It’s the Infamous Five, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 19, 2004), https://goo.gl/iLZDwu (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review); but see Yolande House, “THE GRANDMOTHER OF MARIJUANA
PROHIBITION” THE MYTH OF EMILY MURPHY AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN CANADA (2003),
https://goo.gl/gYWYdn (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
69. In 1962 there were a reported 20 cannabis-related prosecutions. In 1972 there were 12,000. Leah
Spicer, Historical and Cultural Uses of Cannabis and the Canadian “Marijuana Clash”, Senate of Canada pt.
II.B (Apr. 12, 2002), https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/371/ille/library/spicer-e.htm (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
70. Health Protection Branch, Dep’t of Nat’l Health and Welfare, Cannabis Control Policy: A Discussion
Paper (Jan. 1979), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/ccp/ccp_46.htm (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
71. Benedict Fischer, Sharan Kuganesan & Robin Room, Medical Marijuana Programs: Implications for
Cannabis Control Policy—Observations from Canada, 26 INT’L J. OF DRUG POL’Y 15-16 (2015).
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the U.S., however, the controversial nature of marijuana prohibition, and its
impact on convicted users, prompted a federal inquiry into marijuana policy
reform.72 The Le Dain Commission Report of 1972 called for a federal repeal of
the marijuana prohibition on personal cultivation and use.73 While not adopted by
subsequent governments, the report prompted calls for decriminalization and
legalization on a national level, and set the stage for judicial intervention.74
Terrance Parker suffered from epilepsy and frequent seizures.75 He attempted
to control the seizures through surgery and conventional medications, but found
that only marijuana was an effective treatment.76 Not having a legal source of
marijuana, Parker grew it himself, and was subsequently charged with violating
federal marijuana prohibition laws.77 His appeal reached the Court of Appeal for
Ontario, whose remarkable decision in Regina v. Parker, 49 O.R. (3d) 481
[2000], deemed the federal prohibition of marijuana unconstitutional on the
grounds that prohibiting medical use in cases where it is necessary represents a
deprivation of liberty, security, and fundamental justice.78 The Court
characterized Canada’s experience with marijuana regulation as “an
embarrassing history based upon misinformation and racism.”79 The prohibition
on marijuana possession was invalidated, with a delay of the invalidity of one
year provided so as to allow Parliament to craft appropriate regulatory
legislation.80
Accordingly, the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations (MMAR) were
passed in 2001.81 Under the MMAR, medical marijuana could be provided if
prospective patients’ conditions were on the federal list of severe or chronic
illnesses.82 With a prescription, a patient could obtain marijuana directly from the
government, or cultivate marijuana at home.83 The system was problematic,
however. Few patients qualified for prescriptions, and the supply of marijuana
was inconsistent.84 Many continued to obtain marijuana outside of the federal
program.85
72. Le Dain Report on Drugs Divides Cabinet, CBC, http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/ledain-report-ondrugs-divides-cabinet (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
73. Gerald Le Dain, Heinz Lehmann & J. Peter Stein, The Report of the Canadian Government
Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs – 1972, SCHAFFER LIBRARY OF DRUG POL’Y (1972),
https://goo.gl/CaZzqk (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
74. Le Dain Report on Drugs Divides Cabinet, supra note 72.
75. Parker, supra note 14, at ¶ 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at ¶ 10.
79. Id. at ¶ 126.
80. Id. at ¶ 21.
81. Fischer, supra note 71, at 16.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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In Regina v. J.P., 64 O.R. (3d) 757 (2003), the Court of Appeal for Ontario
found the MMAR insufficient to overcome the deprivations of liberty, security,
and fundamental justice created by preventing patients from accessing medical
marijuana.86 Subsequent decisions reinforced this point,87 including a 2008
decision invalidating the MMAR’s provisions severely restricting the supply of
marijuana.88 The opinion noted that while the government may have an interest in
regulating the size and number of cultivators, its regulations cannot be so
restrictive so as to preclude access to medical patients.89
Reform of the MMAR came in 2014 with passage of the Marihuana for
Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR).90 The MMPR broadens the pool of
potential medical users by authorizing licensed physicians to prescribe marijuana
for conditions they deem appropriate, doing away with the MMAR’s limited list
of conditions.91 In addition, the MMPR withdrew the government as a marijuana
supplier, and instead tasks Health Canada with licensing and regulating
cultivators.92 Despite these changes, the supply of marijuana remains limited,
partly due to the low number of licensed cultivators.93
While Canada’s experience with federal medical marijuana legalization and
regulation is mixed, the new Labour Party-controlled government (brought to
power in 2015), is moving forward with promises to legalize and regulate
marijuana for recreational use.94 The Task Force on Cannabis Legalization and
Regulation’s 2016 report calls for an overhaul of the current regulatory
framework for medical marijuana, opening the doors to small-scale farmers,
promoting environmentally sound growing practices (such as outdoor farming),
and envisioning a parallel market for hemp production.95 It remains to be seen if
full-blown legalization for recreational use will be implemented, but considering
its importance in the Labour Party’s campaign platform, legislation in the coming
months appears likely.

86. Regina v. J.P. (2003), 64 O.R. 3d 757, ¶ 17 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
87. See Regina v. Long (2007), 88 O.R. 3d 146, ¶ 4 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
88. Sfetkopoulos v. Canada (2008), FC 33, 399–400 (Can. Ont. Fed. Ct.).
89. “[I]t may well be that there could be justification for limiting the size of operations of designated
producers, to facilitate supervision and inspection for quality and security. But any new regulations to this end will
have to be justified as having a demonstrable purpose rationally related to legitimate state interests. No such
justification has been offered . . . .” Id. at 409.
90. Canada Medical Marijuana (MMPR) Guide: 25 Questions & Answers, Leaf Science (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.leafscience.com/2014/04/01/canada-medical-marijuana-mmpr-guide-25-questions-answers/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 20; Application
Process: Becoming a Licensed Producer of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 21.
94. A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada, supra note 4, at 2.
95. Id. at 4.
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III. SUBNATIONAL APPROACHES TO MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE REGULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
Because the U.S. federal government has not pursued a national approach to
marijuana legalization and regulation, the U.S. experience is limited to those of
the individual states. However, because many states have recently passed
legislation and are actively addressing marijuana agriculture more or less
independently of one another, there are a diversity of regulatory approaches to
compare. This section will profile three states in particular: California, which
legalized medical marijuana use in 1996 and recreational use twenty years later
in 2016;96 Colorado, which legalized medical use in 2000 and recreational use in
2012;97 and Washington, which legalized medical use in 1998 and recreational
use in 2012.98 These states were selected because they have a relatively
meaningful history of marijuana regulation, they have significant numbers of
marijuana farmers, and they have taken different approaches to the regulation of
marijuana agriculture.
Despite their differing regulatory frameworks, all three states share a
common feature: involvement of local governments in the regulation of
marijuana agriculture. The cause is likely multi-faceted. States may want to
foster a multitude of regulatory approaches in order to experiment with and
identify those rules and regulations that might work best on the state level. In
addition, since legalization has thus far taken place primarily by ballot initiative,
legislatures may be politically hesitant to embrace the marijuana industry, and
providing a strong role for local governments may be an effective means of
reducing political conflicts.
In any case, local governments are likely to use their power to make
ordinances as the primary legal mechanism to regulate marijuana agriculture.
Ordinances have the force of law, and can be created to regulate a variety of local
issues, such as public health and safety, land use, and use of public spaces.
Counties or municipalities are granted the power to enact ordinances from state
constitutions or state statutes. California regulations, for example, authorize local
governments to enact local laws in accordance with the state statute.99 Colorado
grants extensive powers to city and county governments, allowing them to
increase taxes or prohibit marijuana cultivation altogether.100 Washington did not
initially grant cities and counties the power to enact marijuana regulations, but

96. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (West 2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1
(West 2016).
97. Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2012) (constitutional amendment 64).
98. Wash. Initiative 692 (1998); Wash. Initiative 502 (2012).
99. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST OF AB 266, (Oct. 9, 2015). “(a) Pursuant to Section 7 of Article XI
of the California Constitution, . . . a . . . county may adopt ordinances that establish additional standards,
requirements, and regulations for local licenses and permits for commercial cannabis activity.” Id.
100. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, subd. 5(e), 5(f).
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many municipalities took it upon themselves to enact their own regulations
anyway, a practice that was subsequently upheld in Green Collar LLC v. Pierce
County.101 The participation of local governments in the regulation of marijuana
agriculture is likely to continue as states delicately move forward with
legalization.
A note on a fourth approach being used by a number of states with nascent
marijuana regulation frameworks is worth mentioning briefly. While California,
Colorado, and Washington are developing laws to allow for a broad farming
community, states like Florida,102 New York,103 and Ohio104 would limit
cultivation licenses to less than a dozen. This type of approach allows the state to
carefully select responsible cultivators, makes it easy to monitor cultivation, and
buys time before presumably shifting to a more expansive model. With so few
cultivators, states can lavish regulatory attention on the licensees to ensure
compliance, or craft site-specific rules depending on the needs and cultivation
infrastructure of the operation.105 And in a sense the system is predictable by
making it clear that only a select number of businesses may cultivate marijuana.
There are two major drawbacks to this model. Although limiting cultivation
licenses might promote sustainability and reduce the regulatory burden, it is hard
to find equity or public support when the state permits only a small handful of
cultivators to participate in the market. Ohio’s 2015 constitutional amendment
initiative to legalize marijuana included a list of landowners who would have had
exclusive rights to cultivate marijuana in the state.106 The attempt to control the
market prompted some legislators to introduce a constitutional amendment of
their own that would prohibit the state’s constitution from being used to create
economic monopolies.107 Voters rejected the legalization monopoly initiative

101. Green Collar LLC v. Pierce County, No. 14-2-11323-0 WL 8187081 (Wash. 2014); see also Att’y
Gen. Bob Ferguson, Whether Statewide Initiative Establishing System for Licensing Marijuana Producers,
Processors, and Retailers Preempts Local Ordinances, AGO 2014 No. 2 (2014).
102. S.B. 1030, 2014 Leg., 2014–2016 Sess. (Fla. 2014).
103. A.B. A06357, 2013 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); see also Catherine Rafter, New York
State Just Granted Five Medical Marijuana Licenses, OBSERVER NEWS (July 31, 2015), http://goo.gl/JqBdtG
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
104. Programs: Cultivation, OHIO MED. MARIJUANA CONTROL PROGRAM, http://www.medical
marijuana.ohio.gov/cultivation (last visited July 15, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
105. In principle states can tailor any number of water or agricultural permits, but there is a limit to how
extensive the specifications can be when administering large volumes of permit applications. See Gary D.
Lynne, J. S. Shonkwiler & Michael E. Wilson, Water Permitting Behavior Under the 1972 Florida Water
Resources Act, 67 LAND ECON. 340, 348 (1991).
106. The amendment’s text includes the tax parcel numbers of the properties in question: “Subject to the
exceptions set forth herein, there shall be only ten MGCE facilities, which shall operate on the following real
properties: (1) Being an approximate 40.44 acre area in Butler County, Ohio, identified by the Butler County
Auditor, as of February 2, 2015, as tax parcel numbers Q6542084000008 and Q6542084000041[. . .].” OHIO
CONST. ART. XV, § 12 (proposed amendment to add section 12).
107. H.R.J. Res. 4, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015).
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(which lacked support from some pro-legalization groups) while approving the
anti-monopoly amendment.108
Even if the state transitions to a more permissive model eventually, the
previously licensed cultivators will have a government-given leg-up on the
competition. And while the state may have developed the capacity to create sitespecific regulations under the restrictive model, those capacities would be less
relevant when cultivation proliferates and a more comprehensive regulatory
approach is needed.
More importantly perhaps, severe limitations on cultivation licenses ignore
the existence and persistence of black market cultivators. If marijuana cultivation
were not occurring to begin with, or were unlikely to take root, a limited
licensing approach might be sensible. But marijuana is widely available in part
because domestic cultivation is increasing across the United States, particularly
on private lands.109 With legalization efforts gaining momentum and spreading
knowledge on cultivation methods, it seems unlikely that marijuana cultivation
will remain dormant for long. Considering the size and growth of the marijuana
industry, eradication of unlicensed marijuana cultivators is unlikely.110 Limiting
cultivation to a small handful of businesses offers transitional benefits, but is
unlikely to be a sound long-term solution.
A. California
California represents the United States’ largest marijuana agriculture region
by a significant margin. California’s 50,000 marijuana farms account for 60% of
all marijuana grown in the United States.111 According to one study, 80% of
marijuana consumed in the U.S. in 2012 was grown in California.112 However, it
would be misleading to suggest that this growth has been a deliberate result of
state agricultural policies. While recent reforms are progressively addressing
marijuana agriculture issues in an attempt to make the industry strong and safe,
for many years the legalization process was lacking in meaningful regulations.
In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use
Act (CUA).113 With the CUA California became the first state to legalize the

108. Matt Pearce, Ohio Voters Soundly Reject Marijuana Legalization Initiative, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2015), http://goo.gl/SQHO1x (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
109. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY 25 (2014).
110. The DEA has described the shift in cultivation practices toward private lands as an obstacle to law
enforcement and eradication. Id. at 26.
111. Alissa Walker, How Growing More Weed Can Help California Fix Its Water Problems, GIZMODO
(Oct. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/ZEwFpT (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
112. According to one study, by 2010 nearly eighty percent of marijuana consumed in the United States
came from California. Emily Brady, How Humboldt Became America’s Marijuana Capital, SALON NEWS (June
30, 2013), http://goo.gl/529p1p (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
113. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2017).

103

2017 / Approaches to Marijuana Agriculture Regulation in the U.S. and Canada
medicinal use of marijuana, exempting patients and prescribing physicians from
criminal prosecution.114 The text of the act was short, and did not address how the
state or local governments were intended to regulate the marijuana industry. It
did not, for example, assign regulatory authority to an administrative agency,
articulate limits on possession or cultivation, or propose a broad regulatory
framework from which the state or local governments could operate.
In the wake of the CUA, a legal medical marijuana industry was created in
California, and the industry experienced tremendous growth, notwithstanding the
absence of any meaningful state regulations. But the CUA’s omissions prompted
the state legislature to enact the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA) in
2003, which, among other measures, restricted the number of plants medical
marijuana patients or designated caregivers could cultivate,115 and assigned
further regulatory authority to the Attorney General.116 Even these limits,
however, became legally ambiguous guidelines after the California Supreme
Court ruled that the rights established by constitutional amendment Proposition
215 could not be limited by legislative act.117 The upshot of these early
experiments with marijuana legalization is that California’s burgeoning
marijuana industry has been more or less unregulated for twenty years.
Many farmers would welcome the security of being in compliance with state
and local laws, while being distinguished from cartel operations or destructive
“trespass grows” on public lands. As it stands, farms on private property remain
vulnerable to police raids and asset forfeiture laws,118 and are unable to take
advantage of typical agricultural government services, such as crop insurance
programs or pesticide-free certifications.
Fortunately, change is on the horizon in California. In January 2016, the
Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA) came into effect, with
ambitious proposals to create comprehensive regulations for marijuana
agriculture.119 The MMRSA assigns authority for various regulatory
responsibilities to a variety of state agencies, including the Department of Food
and Agriculture, Department of Fish and Wildlife, Department of Public Health,
and the State Water Resources Control Board.120 Said the author of the bill,
“cultivators are going to have to comply with the same kinds of regulations that
typical farmers do. . .it’s going to be treated like an agriculture product.”121 Many
114. Id.
115. S.B. 420 § 11362.77, 2003 Leg., 2003–2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
116. Id.
117. People v. Kelly, 77 Cal. App. 4th 390 (2010).
118. Adrian Fernandez Baumann, A Carrot and Stick for Pot Farmers, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Aug. 12,
2015), http://goo.gl/9SMmTN (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
119. S.B. 643, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
120. 2017 Cal. Stat. ch. 719.
121. Assembly Members Urge Governor Brown to Sign Medical Marijuana Package, NEWS CHANNEL 3,
http://goo.gl/oq7fcN (last visited March 28, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(quoting Jim Wood, 2nd Assembly District).
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considered the MMRSA to be a critical precursor to recreational marijuana use
regulations that would be necessary should recreational use be legalized. That
concern proved prescient.
In November 2016, California voters passed Proposition 64, the Adult Use of
Marijuana Act (AUMA).122 AUMA legalized marijuana for recreational use, and
largely mirrored the MMRSA by delegating specific responsibilities to a broad
array of state agencies. AUMA’s cultivation regulations are also similar to the
MMRSA’s, requiring farmers to comply with environmental laws, pesticide
restrictions, and licensing requirements. At the same time, AUMA calls for the
state to create an organic certification program, plant labeling and tracking, and
potentially designations of origin.
AUMA departs from the MMRSA in one important respect, however. While
the MMRSA limited the total canopy size of indoor farms to half an acre, and
outdoor farms to one acre, AUMA’s drafters included a provision that would
allow the state to issue Type 5 licenses. No canopy size limits are imposed on
Type 5 licenses, paving the way for large-scale, industrial production of
marijuana.123 Large-scale cultivation may flood the market with cheap marijuana,
but at the cost of quality control and the livelihoods of the state’s many artisanal
small-scale farmers. Type 5 licenses cannot be issued before 2023, so the state
will have time to consider the issue. However, a battle between small-scale
farmers and agricultural conglomerates seeking to take over the industry may
loom large on these discussions.
B. Colorado
Colorado legalized recreational marijuana in 2012 by passing Amendment
64: The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act.124 The alcohol analogy was a
clever political tactic by legalization proponents, as it situates marijuana into the
same seemingly benign category. However, the analogy may suggest a regulatory
blind-spot. Unlike California, which has been recently proactive in
acknowledging and regulating the agricultural side of the marijuana industry,
Colorado has employed a more piece-meal approach to agricultural regulation.
In order to thoughtfully develop legislation for a legal marijuana market in
Colorado, a task force was established to investigate legal and regulatory issues
and propose legislative and executive actions. The task force appropriately
identified some agricultural issues,125 such as the need to regulate pesticides and
waste products, tax cultivators, and establish cultivation limits,126 but broader
122. Cal. Proposition 64 (California Adult Use of Marijuana Act of 2016).
123. Id. at § 26061(d).
124. The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of 2012. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
125. STATE OF COLORADO, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64, (Mar.
13, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/HqWF2F (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
126. Bryce Pardo, Cannabis Policy Reforms in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of Colorado,
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issues central to agricultural development (such as water use or permitted
cultivation practices) were not addressed.127
Colorado has since struggled to develop a regulatory framework that
efficiently assigns responsibilities among agencies. The state’s experience with
marijuana agriculture demonstrates the difficulty of regulating the industry’s
many facets. Colorado’s Marijuana Enforcement Division, for example, is
defined by its regulatory identification with marijuana, but not agriculture.128 The
state’s Department of Agriculture, conversely, is equipped to regulate traditional
crops but has received little guidance on how to address marijuana cultivation.129
When the Department reached out to the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for guidance on which general crop group (e.g., herbs, spices,
vegetables) marijuana fits into for purposes of pesticide regulation, the EPA
could only state that marijuana fits into none of these groups.130 Colorado’s
Marijuana Enforcement Division and Department of Agriculture are both statelevel agencies that do not have sufficient interdisciplinary expertise at present.
The challenge can be more pronounced at local levels where it can be difficult to
establish regulatory capacity on one dimension, much less two.
Ultimately, Colorado’s early experience with marijuana agriculture
regulation is notable for the state’s adoption of a vertical integration model. In
other words, marijuana farmers were required to sell what they grew, and
dispensaries were required to grow what they sold. For regulators, the advantage
of vertical integration is that it reduces the number of marijuana businesses in
operation, and makes it easier to track the supply chain from seed to sale. There
are advantages for marijuana businesses as well—vertical integration increases
profit margins by reducing the number of profit-seeking firms in the supply
chain, while allowing for more control over inventory. Vertically-integrated
businesses may also cut down on redundant business expenses. The vertical
integration model is mandatory in Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, New
Hampshire, and New Mexico.131
Washington and Uruguay, 25 INT’L J. OF DRUG POL’Y 727 (2014); see H.B. 13-1318, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013). The task force’s recommendations were largely adopted by the state legislature and
passed in May 2013. H.B. 13-1317, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013).
127. STATE OF COLORADO, supra note 125, at 47, 66.
128. See ENFORCEMENT DIVISION–MARIJUANA, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, ANNUAL UPDATE (2015).
129. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., FACTUAL AND POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF
PESTICIDES ON CANNABIS, available at https://goo.gl/FgFwN2 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (receiving little guidance from the federal EPA regarding pesticide
regulations); and Letter from John W. Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado, to Tom Vilsack, Secretary of the
U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. (Feb. 20, 2014), available at https://goo.gl/jQn4iD (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (requesting assistance from the federal Department of Agriculture regarding industrial
hemp cultivation).
130. COLO. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 129.
131. 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 725.105 (2013) (see page 2 of guidance at http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/
dph/quality/medical-marijuana/municipal-guidance-august-2016.pdf); 10-144-122 ME. CODE R., § 6.4.1.1.2
(Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Program; dictates the amount of marijuana a dispensary is permitted to
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On the other hand, the Colorado experience demonstrates that mandatory
vertical integration has its drawbacks. It is significantly more expensive to
finance a business that incorporates the cultivation, post-production, and retail
sale of marijuana. By some estimates, it can be three to ten times more expensive
to establish a vertically-integrated marijuana business than a retail dispensary.132
More expertise is required to handle a diversity of marijuana business activities.
And by wedding each stage of the supply chain together, risk is increased: failure
in any one aspect of the business is likely to affect the other aspects as well. In
general, it is unusual to require vertical integration, and the marijuana industry is
one of the only sectors in which this occurs.133
In the early years of Colorado’s medical marijuana market, when vertical
integration was required, the regulatory requirements were so onerous that over a
third of operators went out of business.134 Other states, recognizing the costs and
benefits, have opted to allow, but not require, vertical integration. Nevada has
adopted this approach,135 while Colorado eventually abandoned its initial vertical
integration requirement.136 Considering the nascent state of the marijuana
industry, it may be useful to allow a diversity of approaches in order to collect
evidence on how the industry might grow and stabilize in the future. The same
can be said about regulating the industry as well, however: there is value in
letting states experiment with a diversity of regulatory approaches.
Vertical integration is likely to have particular implications on the
agricultural component of the marijuana industry. Where it is required, it will
make cultivation one component of a broader marijuana business, while reducing
the likelihood that marijuana can become one of several crops grown on a single
farm. More and more farmers growing traditional crops are considering
incorporating marijuana into their crop portfolio,137 but in states where vertical
integration is mandatory it seems unlikely that these farmers will want to devote
grow); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I (West 2010) (New Jersey Compassionate use of Marijuana Act; permits
approved alternative treatment centers to cultivate, grow, harvest and sell their own marijuana); H.B. 573-FN §
2, 2013 Leg., 2013 Sess. (N.H. 2013) (New Hampshire Use of Cannabis for Therapeutic Purposes; similar to
NJ, does not include purchase as an acceptable activity by an alternative treatment center); N.M. CODE R.
7.34.4.8(A)(2) (2015) (New Mexico Medical Cannabis Program; focuses on the amount of plants a non-profit
producer is permitted to grow, but does allow for usable cannabis trade from other licensed producers).
132. Whit Richardson, Pros and Cons of Vertical Integration, 4FRONT ADVISORS, http://goo.gl/3GRuo0
(last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
133. Id.
134. See John Ingold, Colorado Lawmakers Question Proposed Marijuana Business Rules, THE DENVER
POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://goo.gl/TSLZkW (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); and Tim
Sprinkle, For Cannabis Entrepreneurs, Industry Expansion Brings Growing Pains, YAHOO FINANCE (Mar. 11,
2013), http://goo.gl/7vrbDh (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
135. S.B. 374, 2017 Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453A.200(3) (2017) (allows
retailers, cultivators and in limited cases users to produce usable marijuana).
136. Ingold, supra note 134.
137. See, e.g., Rob Hotakainen, With No Federal Water, Pot Growers Could be High and Dry,
MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU (Apr. 27, 2014), http://goo.gl/Saqphi (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
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their resources to post-production and retail in order to do so. The effect is that
the marijuana industry remains introverted, minimally engaged with the broader
agricultural community. On the other hand, the supply of marijuana is
presumably less likely to fluctuate wildly relative to demand if farmers are
required to sell what they grow. By tying cultivation and retail together, both
activities may be more responsive to each other.
Nonetheless, there are promising benefits and concerning costs to vertical
integration. Colorado eventually moved away from a vertical integration model,
and now permits farmers to stick to what they know best: farming. But the state’s
regulatory framework for the marijuana industry lacks a proactive focus on the
agricultural component of the marijuana industry, an oversight with
environmental implications. Because Colorado’s marijuana regulations promote
indoor cultivation, the environmental impact of the marijuana industry has been
significant. Indoor marijuana farms comprise over half of new demand for
power.138 Power providers and state regulators are scrambling to adjust to rapid
changes in the energy sector caused by growth in marijuana agriculture.139
Nonetheless, Colorado should be lauded for continuing to study, tinker, and
reform the state’s regulatory frameworks for the marijuana industry. The
experience is new for the state’s policymakers and regulators, and a blueprint on
how to regulate the industry does not yet exist. While vertical integration was
problematic, and the environmental impacts of indoor agriculture persist,
Colorado appears well poised to refine its regulation of marijuana agriculture to
adapt to new realities.
C. Washington
When Washington voters passed Initiative 502 in 2012, legalizing the
recreational use of marijuana, they authorized the state to concentrate regulatory
authority over the industry into one primary agency, the Washington State Liquor
Control Board.140 Thus, while California represents the agency authority
fragmentation approach, Washington represents the agency authority
consolidation approach. The Washington State Liquor Control Board has been
designated with primary authority to develop rules and regulations for marijuana,
including aspects of marijuana agriculture, pursuant to legislation authorizing the
“state liquor control board to regulate” marijuana.141

138. Jennifer Oldham, As Pot-Growing Expands, Electricity Demands Tax U.S. Grids, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(Dec. 21, 2015), http://goo.gl/JO0dte (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
139. One Pennsylvania Public Utility Commissioner said, “We are at the edge of this [. . .] we are looking
all across the country for examples and best practices.” Id.
140. Part I of Initiative 502 authorizes the Liquor Control Board “to regulate and tax marijuana for
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One of the benefits of centralized marijuana regulation is that it may provide
clarity. The administrative agency assigned to (or created for the purposes of)
marijuana regulation is aware of its broad mandate, other agencies are not
confused by their rights and duties, and the private sector and other stakeholders
can direct their attention to a single agency instead of navigating a complex web
of agencies and rules.142 A second benefit is that states can more clearly invest
human and financial resources in a single agency, whereas distributing those
resources across a network of agencies requires a more nuanced understanding of
existing agency capacities and needs, and investments can more easily become
politically influenced.143 Third, because marijuana implicates a diversity of
processes, including the regulation of cultivation, processing, distribution, retail
sale, and consumption, as well as the agricultural, economic, and public health
components of the marijuana industry, a single agency with authority over the
industry as a whole is well-suited to coordinate regulatory activities and create a
coherent legal framework as a whole.
Unfortunately, regulating marijuana agriculture has not been as neat as
Washington may have initially expected. Inevitably, perhaps, the expertise and
traditional functions of other agencies have created exceptions to the centralized
agency paradigm. Washington’s Department of Agriculture, for example, has
taken an increased role in marijuana cultivation, establishing rules for pesticide
and fertilizer use, agricultural worker safety, and waste disposal.144 The
Washington Department of Ecology has also suggested that marijuana farmers
will be subject to the usual environmental regulations the department oversees.145
While these developments may positively take advantage of each agency’s
expertise, the state would benefit from a regulatory framework that more clearly
authorizes agencies with secondary responsibilities to engage in their areas of
expertise.
Aside from this horizontal approach to regulation, Washington’s vertical
approach to regulation of the marijuana industry is similar to the regulatory
organization of the alcohol industry. Cultivators cannot hold dispensary licenses,
while dispensaries cannot hold cultivation licenses. Vertical integration, in other
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words, is prohibited.146 The model is similar to regulation of the alcohol industry,
where there is a mandatory delineation between producers, distributors, and
retailers.147 The idea is that by breaking up supply chain integration, businesses
have less incentive to promote alcohol or drug abuse, and each group can focus
on providing goods and services in their area of specialization. The model has
had limited success in the alcohol industry, where distributors have become
powerful middlemen and may be dampening the potential for innovation.
However, it does not yet appear that interest groups in the marijuana industry
have obtained and exerted undue power over Washington regulators, providing
hope that the state’s regulatory model will be sustainable in the long-term.
IV. A NATIONAL APPROACH TO MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE REGULATION IN
CANADA
In contrast to the United States’ state-led legalization and regulation efforts,
Canada’s regulatory regime lies primarily on the national level. As required by
judicial decisions in Regina v. Parker, Regina v. J.P., and Sfetkopoulos v.
Canada, among others, the Canadian government implemented a framework for
regulating the marijuana industry. With regard to Canada’s approach to
marijuana agriculture, the Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR)
reformed the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations (MMAR) in several
important respects.
A. Cultivation Requirements of the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations
The MMAR, established in 2001, was a very limited medical marijuana
scheme. Because the enumerated medical conditions that would qualify for
marijuana treatment were so few (and relatively rare), Health Canada (tasked
with administering the program) was not overly concerned about developing a
robust supply chain. Approved medical marijuana patients could obtain
marijuana from three sources: they could grow it themselves, a “designated
supplier” could grow it on their behalf, or it could be purchased directly from
Health Canada. This cultivation framework was problematic in several ways.
First, the MMAR’s limits on home cultivation were excessively complex, using
formulas instead of straightforward plant and storage quantity limits.148 In
addition to the confusing cultivation regulations, the application processes for
both patients and designated suppliers were cumbersome, especially when
compared to the relative ease many users experienced when purchasing
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marijuana on the illicit market.149 When the market developed a work-around in
the form of “compassion clubs” designed to collectively organize, grow, and
supply marijuana on behalf of medical marijuana patients, the government
cracked down and interpreted compassion clubs as a violation of the MMAR.150
Marijuana supplied directly by Health Canada was equally problematic. In
order to meet its statutory obligation to provide access to marijuana to medical
patients, Health Canada awarded a $5.7 million contract to a single company—
Prairie Plant Systems (PPS)—tasked with cultivating marijuana on the
government’s behalf.151 The results were underwhelming. PPS first proposed to
base its farming operations at the bottom of a former zinc and copper mine in
Manitoba, where tests had found elevated levels of heavy metal contamination in
air, water, and soil samples.152 The quality of the marijuana grown by PPS was
suspect as well.153 Although Health Canada claimed a THC content level of 10%,
tests revealed THC levels were consistently lower, and some biological tests
found mold and other biological impurities in the marijuana.154 There was little
evidence that Health Canada was testing the marijuana before delivering it to
patients, despite charging a significant retail mark-up. And to make matters
worse for patients, they were given no choice with respect to the marijuana’s
psychoactive characteristics or potency, strain, or cultivation method (e.g.,
organic).
The results of the MMAR’s cultivation regulations were predictable. Of the
few patients who were approved for medical marijuana use, very few of them
obtained their marijuana from the government.155 Most—over 80%—chose to
grow their own supply.156 Patients who purchased Health Canada’s marijuana
rated the quality of the marijuana received in very low terms, and many
attempted to return the product for a refund.157 From a broader perspective, it is
clear that most Canadian marijuana users continued to obtain marijuana from the
black market, despite the existence of the MMAR.
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B. Cultivation Requirements of the Marihuana for Medical Purposes
Regulations
These concerns led to an overhaul of marijuana regulations, culminating in
the Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR). The MMPR altered
the regulatory landscape in several very significant ways. First, the MMPR
abolished the MMAR’s enumerated list of medical conditions that qualify a
patient for medical marijuana use. Instead, the MMPR places the burden of
diagnosis and treatment on medical professionals, a gate-keeping responsibility
the medical community did not necessarily appreciate.158
Nonetheless, the relinquishment of the patient licensing process was
accompanied by a renewed focus on cultivation regulations. This shift was
accomplished in three steps. First, the MMPR eliminated the MMAR’s personal
cultivation or designated supplier provisions.159 While some MMAR-sanctioned
patients with home grows were grandfathered in, the MMPR’s many new
patients were no longer able to grow their own supply.160 Second, the government
eliminated its role as a marijuana supplier.161 Criticisms of Health Canada and
PPS—and the quality, price, and availability of their marijuana—were fierce, and
it appears the government recognized that it had little to gain by involving itself
as a market participant of sorts.
The chain of supply, therefore, was created in a third and final step. The
MMPR adopted a new regulatory approach in which the government would act in
a licensing and monitoring capacity over approved cultivators.162 In this way,
Health Canada maintains a strong regulatory presence over marijuana agriculture,
without involving itself directly in agricultural activities. Unfortunately, the
agency’s complex bureaucratic requirements appear to be stifling cultivators
from participating in the market. To date, Health Canada has only issued thirtyseven cultivation licenses nation-wide,163 despite receiving 1,561 applications.164
Eleven Canadian provinces have two cultivators or less.165 Ontario, by contrast,
contains twenty-four of the thirty-seven licensed cultivators.166 This distribution

158. Fischer, supra note 71, at 16.
159. Compare Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations, SOR/2013-119 (Can.), repealed by
SOR/2016-230, s. 281, with Medical Marihuana Access Regulations, repealed by SOR/2013-119, s. 267
(Can.).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 20.
164. See Application Process: Becoming a Licensed Producer of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra
note 21.
165. See Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 20. Five
provinces have no licensed cultivators. Id.
166. Id.

112

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49
is hardly equitable from a geographic perspective, nor is it likely to be supplying
the demand for marijuana amongst the Canadian public.
The MMPR did make some positive changes to the previous regulatory
framework. Health Canada does limit the strains sold by licensed cultivators,
allowing for a more diverse product base for medical patients. In addition, the
government is no longer a middleman marking up prices; cultivators are free to
set their own prices as the market dictates. In other respects, however, the MMPR
is overly restrictive. By prohibiting outdoor agriculture, cultivators are forced to
artificially reproduce the light, soil, and water conditions found on outdoor farms.
In addition, the MMPR only permits the cultivation and sale of dried marijuana.
Derivative products often popular with medical users—such as resins, oils, and
edibles—remain prohibited.167
C. Looking Forward to Legalization Legislation and Agricultural Regulations
The Labour Party-led federal government has promised to legalize and
regulate recreational marijuana use. Not surprisingly, it may take some time to
develop and implement this legislation, and it remains to be seen how the
government will address marijuana agriculture. Still, early signs are encouraging.
In August of 2016, the government adopted the Access to Cannabis for Medical
Purposes Regulations (ACMPR).168 While the ACMPR preserves the MMPR in
many ways, it makes a simple but significant change by allowing medical
marijuana patients to cultivate their own marijuana plants for personal
consumption, or allow a designated supplier to do so on their behalf.169 In this
sense, the ACMPR incorporates the MMAR’s personal cultivation allowances
into the MMPR. While not an overhaul of the cultivation regulations in the
MMPR, this tweak should improve access to marijuana while the country waits
for legalization legislation to change the landscape.
If the Task Force on Cannabis Legalization and Regulation’s report is any
indication, the landscape change will be dramatic. The report calls for new
cultivation regulations that reform the existing framework in at least two major
ways: 1) licensing schemes should be adapted and made more flexible and
permissive in order to promote a diversity of cultivators, including small-scale
farmers; and 2) environmental protection and sustainability should be promoted
through regulations that include licensing and supporting outdoor farmers.170
According to the Task Force, the first goal might be achieved by maintaining
production controls, at least in the early stages of legalization.171 The currently
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inadequate licensing scheme could be described as “maintaining production
controls,” which could foreshadow more of the same under a legalization
framework. But the report’s methods of production control are forward-thinking,
calling for limits on facility size or growing areas.172 These restrictions would
have the additional benefit of supporting the development of small-scale, or
artisanal, farming operations.173
With respect to environmental concerns, the report endorses outdoor
agriculture as a more environmentally friendly method of cultivation. “In order to
limit the environmental impact of the cannabis industry, outdoor production
should be permitted.”174 Opening the market to outdoor farmers could also help
diversify the supply chain and support small-scale farmers. Other than this
measure, however, the report is light on other environmental considerations such
as water and energy demands, organic certification programs, and pesticide
regulations. The report’s calls for small-scale cultivation and environmental
stewardship are important steps in the right direction, but a far cry from the
statutory or regulatory language that will address these and other pressing
agricultural issues.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The United States and Canada are both trending toward an end to marijuana
prohibition. A majority of U.S. states have legalized marijuana for medical use.
Canada, meanwhile, is expected to introduce legislation to legalize and regulate
marijuana for recreational use in 2017. And yet, it is clear that both countries are
navigating the end of the prohibition era in drastically different ways. While the
U.S. federal government is uninvolved in (and potentially antagonistic toward)
the legalization movement, the states are flexing their collective political muscles
in bucking the federal prohibition by adopting their own regulatory frameworks
for the marijuana industry. Canada, meanwhile, was forced to create a national
medical marijuana program by a series of judicial decisions. The track record of
this program—the MMAR, MMPR, and ACMPR—is perhaps underwhelming,
and reflects the government’s ambivalence toward legalization and regulation.
But, the current government is now firmly committed to marijuana reform, and a
comprehensive regulatory framework appears to be on the way.
These divergent experiences inform the two countries’ approaches to
marijuana agriculture regulation. Because the U.S. experience has been state-led,
a diversity of agricultural regulation frameworks has emerged. A few states have
adopted a hybrid of the Canadian model, in which the state issues licenses to a
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small number of cultivators so as to maintain control over the supply chain. It is
unlikely this approach will remain sustainable over the long term as the
marijuana industry evolves, but it may prove to be an effective training ground
for state regulators. States with more developed marijuana agriculture industries
are embracing the participation of larger numbers of cultivators.
California does not restrict the total number of farms in operation, but places
limits on the amount of marijuana each farm can grow. The state has also
decentralized its regulatory powers among various state agencies and local
governments, so as to take advantage of institutional and local expertise and
spread the burden of regulation.
Colorado, by contrast, experimented with vertical integration, an
organizational framework that proved inefficient, and in many cases, unprofitable
for cultivators and marijuana businesses. However, Colorado has been willing to
adapt, abandoning the vertical integration requirement, and adopting various
environmental protection measures.
Washington, finally, seeks to separate marijuana businesses into distinct
categories, hoping to prevent the consolidation of the industry. At the same time,
regulatory authority over the marijuana industry is concentrated and held by its
state liquor control board, a choice that simplifies jurisdictional questions while
at the same time requiring a high degree of sophistication and inter-disciplinarity
from the agency itself.
Each of these approaches to marijuana agriculture regulation has its tradeoffs. And, ultimately, what may work in California may not work in Colorado. In
some ways the marijuana industry’s growth may be facilitated by the U.S. federal
marijuana prohibition as it forces states to experiment on their own and become
incubators for new ideas and approaches to agricultural issues.
Canada, by contrast, has approached marijuana agriculture as a process to be
tightly controlled. Starting with the MMAR, in which strict limitations were
placed on personal cultivation, coupled with a government monopoly on largerscale production. Although a small sample size, Health Canada’s experience as a
supplier of marijuana (via government contract with a third party supplier)
suggests that governments should likely permit the private sector to participate in
the agricultural process, ideally by supporting the development of many smallscale and sustainable farmers.
The MMPR’s shift from government-as-marijuana-supplier to governmentas-marijuana-cultivation-licensor was a welcome shift. However, the devil is in
the details, and the MMPR’s onerous regulations and licensing application
process frustrated the expansion of marijuana agriculture in Canada. In addition,
the law’s indoor cultivation requirement needlessly shut out outdoor farmers who
could have diversified the supplier base and provided an alternative model to
compare to.
It appears the Canadian federal government has turned a corner and is ready
to fully legalize marijuana for recreational use. While the government’s Task
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Force report is forward-thinking about several agricultural issues, it is light on
details. The Parliament and its administrative agencies face a tough task, but past
experiences, as well as models provided by the many U.S. states now
experimenting with marijuana agriculture regulation, shine a light on the tradeoffs and considerations regulators and the marijuana industry can expect to face.
A framework that prioritizes the development of a broadly inclusive
agricultural community of small and medium-sized farmers, as well as
environmentally sound agricultural practices, is a regulatory goal that is common
across frameworks. Involving local governments likewise appears to be a sound
approach. Otherwise, there are no easy choices as it concerns regulatory
consolidation vs. decentralization or market integration vs. separation.
Nonetheless, these choices are better informed by studying and reflecting on the
experiences of neighboring jurisdictions. No approach is perfect, especially in
these early days of the legal marijuana industry. But attention to the marijuana
industry’s most pressing agricultural questions, and how governments are
answering them, will remain a critical step toward regulatory reform and
refinement.
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